

The Rise and Fall of Golden Dawn: Organized Racism Suffered a Great Defeat in Greece—But the Fight is Far from Over

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GOLDEN DAWN WAS ALREADY A violent, marginal, neo-Nazi group in the 1980s. But how did it become a regulator of Greece's political life? The economic crisis that plagued Greek society in 2010, the lack of a consistent migration policy, as well as the state's (and other institutional actors') reluctance to acknowledge its extreme far-right past and address xenophobia and racist crime, led to the group's consolidation.

In 2010, Golden Dawn gained a seat on the Athens municipal council. In the 2012 general election, it took almost 7 percent of the vote, electing 21 MPs.¹ Many mark this as the starting point of Golden Dawn's presence in Greece; however, this approach alone leads to a narrow and historically inaccurate interpretation of extremist far-right violence in Greece.

The rise of Golden Dawn must be interpreted as a more complex phenomenon linked to the growing threat of fascism in Greek institutional mechanisms and society.² Its operation was stalled during the Golden Dawn trial proceedings and ultimately interrupted by the October 2020 historic verdict. Wrapping up a long trial that began in April 2015, the presiding judge, Maria Lepenioti, announced the Court's verdict on October 7, 2020. The court concluded that seven of Golden Dawn's former MPs, including the party founder, Nikolaos Michaloliakos, had led a deadly criminal organization. They were all sentenced

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to 10 to 15 years in prison. 20 other prominent members or former MPs were found guilty of participating in the criminal organization, and 27 members of the organization were condemned for specific criminal acts; all were convicted with multi-year sentences, while the murderer of Pavlos Fyssas received a life sentence.

It was a long and historical struggle, with the Court convening for 465 days over 5 years, involving more than 150 witnesses, hundreds of documents of overwhelming evidence, and several pro bono lawyers that fought for the victims' vindication. The trial did not examine ideas, but criminal acts committed in the name of a neo-Nazi ideology that incited hatred against migrants, refugees, LGBT people, leftists, anti-fascists, and, eventually, any democratic citizen opposing neo-Nazi ideology. It condemned these acts and the threat they, and those who commit them, pose to society.³

THE HISTORY

Nikolaos Michaloliakos, the leader of Golden Dawn, and the organization's inner circle have their origins in Kostas Plevris' pre-dictatorship Fourth of August Party (K4A Party). Plevris was and still is a national socialist and an avid Hitler enthusiast. His party presented itself as a fascist front that openly harbored racial theories of "natural inequality" and of fascism as a "value" response to communism, as well as a vivid anti-parliamentarian and antisemitic rhetoric.

Following the 21 April 1967 coup, Plevris placed his organization at the service of the junta, and he, along with some of his closest collaborators, joined the government and attempted—without much success—to pivot the regime towards a "national socialist" ideology.⁴ Michaloliakos joined Plevris' organization in 1973 at the age of 16. During the Polytechnic uprising of November 1973 against the Junta, Michaloliakos acted in support of the forces of repression, and his close collaborator Ilias Tsiapouris shot at protestors from the roof of the Public Order Ministry, leading to the deaths of at least two civilians.⁵

Though the fall of the dictatorship in 1974 provoked a crisis within the country's far-right fraction, it also provided an incubation period for several opportunistic terrorist acts by far-right groups connected to their Italian cohorts in Ordine Nuovo.⁶ Michaloliakos, along with some of those who would a few years later become the founding core of Golden Dawn, was involved in several violent and terrorist incidents, such as the assault against journalists covering the December 1976 funeral of the Junta torturer Evangelos Mallios and his participation in a cinema bombing in March 1978.⁷

Michaloliakos formed Golden Dawn—alongside a magazine he founded with the same name—in December 1980; at first, it functioned as a national-socialist education club. In September 1984, the course of Golden Dawn was disrupted for several months when the incarcerated ex-dictator Papadopoulos entrusted Michaloliakos with the leadership of the youth wing of his National Political Union (EPEN), the party founded to accommodate the whole far-right spectrum.⁸ In January 1985, Michaloliakos resigned because, as he claimed later, EPEN was not antisemitic enough.⁹

Golden Dawn entered the political mainstage when the nationalism surrounding the establishment of Macedonia in the early 1990s coincided with the promotion of the largely fabricated criminality of Balkan migrants, mostly by private television stations.¹⁰ In December 1992, the organization made its presence felt at a large rally in Athens held to protest the declaration of the newly founded neighboring state (part of the ex-Yugoslavia) to be called the “Republic of Macedonia,” violently attacking those they considered “traitors”—that is, the anti-nationalists of the left.¹¹ Since then, several attacks orchestrated by Golden Dawn members have been reported—mostly against migrants and what Golden Dawn considers “internal enemies” (i.e., anarchists and leftists). Most remain uninvestigated.¹² Those cases that have been investigated have resulted in only very minimal sentences. From that moment in Athens, the organization’s violent nature began to deepen.

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THE RISE, THE NORMALIZATION, AND THE SOCIETY’S REACTION

The rapid rise of Golden Dawn coincided with what has been called the “Third Wave” of the extreme right, which emerged mainly in the 1990s and 2000s and focuses on theories of national priority (“Greeks first”) and welfare state chauvinism, while promoting an anti-migrant, anti-Islam agenda.¹³

This movement was made possible by the gradual de-radicalization of Golden Dawn public discourse (though its actions remained radical) and the adoption of a far-right agenda in the political mainstream. This mainstreaming was made possible through several factors, the most significant of which was the legitimization of the far-right party Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS).

LAOS, Greece’s main populist far-right party, was formed in 2000 by George Karatzaferis, a former member of Greece’s major New Democracy party, and remained on the margins for several years. But the deep financial crisis that shook the foundations of the nation in the late 2000s provided the group with new opportunities as Greece entered a spiral of high fiscal deficits,

recession, unemployment, bail-out loans, and austerity.¹⁴ The consequences were unevenly distributed between classes. Resentment grew, and economic issues spilt over into the political realm. An opportunistic realignment of the party system followed. As the crisis unfolded, LAOS began to emerge as a political force on a nationalist, xenophobic platform. The party associated immigration with Greece's domestic problems and found its winning formula.

By 2007, LAOS had entered parliament, and by 2011, it was part of an interim three-party coalition government. According to most scholars, the normalization of the far-right agenda through the mainstreaming of LAOS and its "anti-establishment" party rhetoric in many ways enabled the consolidation of the Golden Dawn operational agenda.¹⁵ The inclusion of LAOS in the coalition government occurred during the same year that Golden Dawn elected Michaloliakos as Municipal councillor of the City of Athens. Golden Dawn's most powerful play was securing a local stronghold in Athens by taking control of a city-center neighborhood with one of the highest non-Greek populations; this was achieved through violent attacks but also door-to-door canvassing.¹⁶

The horrifying climax of this process was the pogrom against migrants that followed the murder of Manolis Kantaris in May 2011. The murder took place in the center of Athens, and the information that "brown-skinned migrants" were responsible for the murder became a rallying cry for far-right organizations. Golden Dawn led the way and exploited the opportunity to unleash assault squads that roamed around the scene of the murder for four days under the pretense of being "outraged citizens."¹⁷ In the context of these violent attacks, Alim Abdul Manan, a 21-year-old Bangladeshi national, was murdered on the night of 11–12 May 2011. The assaults took the form of a coordinated and open pogrom in the afternoon of 12 May, at a rally organized by "central Athens residents" in the presence of hundreds of far-right organizations and neo-Nazis. During the march, groups of Golden Dawn members headed by the later MP Ilias Kasidiaris, bearing clubs, helmets, and iron bars—with the tolerance of the police who were seen in many instances passively standing by the assault squads—chased, beat, and stabbed migrants in the broader Omonia area.¹⁸ The National Emergency Centre recorded 17 injured, 12 of whom sustained severe stab wounds, while dozens of others injured were transferred to the Polyclinic in Omonia. Neither police nor prosecutors undertook any action to identify the perpetrators of these criminal acts and to bring them to justice, although several activist lawyers have submitted a formal request to the prosecution.¹⁹

Unfortunately, the out-in-the-open, overwhelming violence unleashed by Golden Dawn did not prevent the continuous "fascism-washing" by the media

and other institutional stakeholders. In 2012, Stavros Theodorakis, a well-known journalist at the time and, later, a leader of the liberalist party Potami, hosted Michaloliakos on his show *Protagonistes*. During the interview, Michaloliakos had plenty of opportunities to deny the neo-Nazi character of his party, but he instead stated that “six million Jews murdered in the Holocaust is an exaggeration, a lie” and that “attacks on immigrants or homosexuals, who are ‘not normal,’ is a natural consequence.”²⁰ In 2013, Andreas Loverdos, a prominent member of the Socialist Party, stated that “Golden Dawn is the first authentic movement after the Junta.”²¹ Meanwhile, in spite of Gold Dawn’s violent, paganistic, and anti-Christian character, the official Orthodox church proved reluctant to condemn the movement, and in fact, several Archbishops and other church representatives aligned with their methods and actions.²²

Thus, instead of acknowledging the unique neo-Nazi character of the party and creating the very much needed “cordon sanitaire” that would isolate and showcase their criminal character, the Greek political system treated Golden Dawn as a typical populist far-right party.²³ The system tried to take advantage

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of the organization’s extremist rhetoric and capitalize on political gains by placing Golden Dawn at the one extreme of the political spectrum of “anti-systemic, populist, anti-memorandum

parties” within their theory of the two extremes.²⁴ Indicatively, just a few days before the criminal prosecution of Golden Dawn, a prominent political commentator—Babis Papadimitriou, currently an MP of the governing party of New Democracy—wondered why it “wouldn’t be possible for a ‘more serious’ Golden Dawn to become part of a conservative party coalition.”²⁵

By 2012, Golden Dawn had consolidated its position in the Greek parliament; with 426,025 votes, it reached 7 percent of the vote and elected 21 MPs. Even as it took its place in the mainstream, it remained one of the most extreme formations in Europe; inspired by National Socialist ideological and organizational principles and opposed to democracy and liberalism, Golden Dawn preserved its neo-Nazi character. This character is corroborated by several factors: the “hidden Statute of the organization” that was finally revealed in trial; the direct references to Hitler and Rosenberg; the swastikas and other Nazi symbols; the unique, absolute position of the party’s leader comparable

only to the Fuhrer; the organizational structure and the conspiratorial means of operation; and the total obedience to the chain of command and the role of violence against the enemies as a constitutional element of the party's operation.²⁶

Undoubtedly, European political history is familiar with the phenomenon of political parties that operate lawfully yet are either favorably disposed toward or collaborate with illegal organizations, described as “criminal” or “terrorist” by the current legal order. Several far-right parties across Europe have either condoned or even incited violent racist attacks from individuals or groups aligned with their ideas. Golden Dawn is a unique case that challenges the traditional division of relations between the “criminal organization” and the “political party.” The reason is simple: in this case, the criminal organization and the political party coincide. The criminal organization *is* the political party.²⁷

How did such a criminal organization manage to earn the support of 7 percent of the constituency? Furthermore, how was this possible considering that two-thirds of the party's votes were actually transferred from the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and New Democracy (ND), notably the two parties that took turns in power from the restoration of democracy in 1974 until 2009?²⁸ One factor was the mainstreaming of their xenophobic, racist agenda, as analyzed above. The other was the “double language” used: “one discourse for the wide audience, another discourse for the insiders.”²⁹ Following the June 2012 elections and the formation of a government under Antonis Samaras, leader of the conservative New Democracy party, Michaloliakos was the only leader of an opposition party to wish the tripartite coalition a successful term: “We have carefully followed the programmatic statements of the prime minister and, although we have completely divergent opinions on the matter, we nevertheless wish the coalition every success, particularly as far as the economic issue is concerned.”³⁰ A few weeks later, addressing his own public, Michaloliakos expressed his “disgust” for the Parliament: “You are the assault divisions,” he told his organization's members, before threatening that Golden Dawn would leave parliament and take to the streets: “Then we'll show them... then they will know what ‘assault divisions’ means, the meaning of war, of struggle, of bayonets sharpened on the pavement.”³¹

During the same period, the number and intensity of racist crimes skyrocketed; NGOs and migrant communities spoke of dozens of victims, mostly young migrants of Asian origin, arriving at their facilities, heavily beaten.³² The Racist Violence Recording Network, founded at the time to substitute for the lack of recording by official authorities, documented beyond any doubt the *modus operandi* of the assault squads: from the testimonies gathered from the victims

of violent group attacks, the patterns of the perpetrators emerged.³³ They acted in organized groups, moving either by motorcycle or on foot, as if on patrol, often accompanied by large dogs. They were dressed in black and at times with military trousers, wearing helmets or covering their faces. Most assaults occurred after sunset or in the early morning hours. They acted as self-proclaimed vigilante groups who attacked refugees and migrants in the streets, squares, and public transportation stops. In several cases, the victims and witnesses to the attacks reported that they recognized individuals associated with Golden Dawn among the perpetrators, because they wore the insignia of the organization, were seen participating in public events of the organization in the area, or were known as members of the local branches of the party.³⁴

In rare cases, victims reported the attacks to the authorities. The vast majority of victims did not wish to take any further action, mainly because of the fear associated with the lack of legal documentation.³⁵ There were also reports concerning unwillingness or discouragement and, in some cases, refusal on behalf of the police authorities to lodge complaints. Furthermore, some victims did not wish to lodge a complaint because they had previously been victims of police violence or because they knew that the perpetrators had relationships with the police and Golden Dawn, and they thus feared targeted retribution.

Civil society organizations, migrant communities, international bodies, and labor unions all protested, calling for the elementary protection of victims and the investigation of the crimes. The state, drenched in a cemented institutional racism, was nonchalantly inept—until 2013. It took the murder of a Greek citizen, Pavlos Fyssas, for the system to swing into action.³⁶ At least one more murder of a foreigner, Shehzad Luqman, had preceded it.³⁷ But institutional racism places the value of human life on a quite peculiar scale.

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THE TRIAL AND THE #XTHEMOUT CAMPAIGN

“Those who killed yesterday have been practicing for three years on the bodies of immigrants that were always brought here injured and we were shouting about the attacks carried out by these groups,” stated Panagiotis Papanikolaou, doctor at Nikea Hospital, after the murder of 34-year-old Pavlos Fyssas by members of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party. This realization took place only a few days after yet another repetition, by the then-Minister of Citizen Protection, of the statement concerning “isolated incidents of racist violence.”³⁸

Shortly after midnight on 18 September 2013, Pavlos Fyssas, a young Greek anti-fascist rapper, was murdered in Athens, in his home neighborhood

of Keratsini. Both the killer, Giorgos Roupakias, and others who participated in the attack were members of Golden Dawn.³⁹ At last, that was one too many; in the early hours of 28 September 2013, a coordinated police operation led to the arrest of the leader and several prominent members of Golden Dawn on charges of directing a criminal organization. Along with a number of his suspected accomplices, the man accused of murdering Fyssas had been arrested over the previous days. From that point, with criminal investigations launched against dozens of its members, more information about Golden Dawn began to come to light. After a long inquest which lasted nine months, the Court of Appeal decided with an irrevocable decree that 69 individuals, including all of Golden Dawn's Parliamentary Group from the 2012 elections, would be indicted to stand trial charged with participation in a criminal organization.⁴⁰

The trial began on 20 April 2015. The major accusation was based on Article 187 part 1 of the Greek Criminal Code, which defines the nature of a criminal organization.⁴¹ Additionally, three more serious criminal offenses were brought individually before the court: the murder of Pavlos Fyssas, the assassination attempt on Abuzid Embarac and other Egyptian workers in Perama, and the assassination attempt on members of the Greek Communist Party.

8 *Figure 1: Attack against Egyptian fishermen at Perama, June 2012. Artwork by Dimitra Nikolaidi.*



The indictment under which Golden Dawn was tried at the three-member Criminal Court of Appeal included several other individual case files against Golden Dawn and described clearly the group's two mechanisms of criminal action.⁴² On one hand, there was the mobilization of groups of multiple armed men ("assault squads") acting in an organized manner, unexpectedly attacking the organization's enemies, then immediately departing in an orderly fashion, after stating their political affiliation. Such were the attacks against Afghan migrants in Agios Panteleimonas in September 2011; against Pakistani migrants in Ierapetra, Crete, in February 2013; at the Synergeio social space in Ilioupoli in July 2013; and so on. On the other hand, there was the action of smaller groups of people who were involved in the organization. Even when they did not greatly outnumber their victims and were not part of an assault squad, people could act violently in their everyday lives, implementing the group's principles without the presence of a leader. The most characteristic cases of such action were the murder of Shehzad Luqman in Petralona in January 2013 and the intentional grievous bodily harm of an antifascist student in Paleo Faliro in February 2013 by assailants connected to the neo-Nazi organization.⁴³

To see these perpetrators sentenced, the victims of the attacks had to find the courage to present themselves to (often unwilling) police authorities, report the crime, patiently wait for the development of their cases, show up in court, and point out the perpetrators. Together with them, there was usually an unsung hero: a passer-by, a neighbor who opened the window due to the screams, or someone who happened to be sitting on a bench close by. These were the people that made it possible to unravel the extent of Golden Dawn's criminal activity. Having personally been summoned to testify in the Golden Dawn trial in my capacity as coordinator of the Racist Violence Recording Network between 2011 and 2015, I tried to summarize the events of this period: "Not all racist violence in the Greek

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society is linked with Golden Dawn; however, all organized racist violence of this period has a *modus operandi* that is characteristic of the

Golden Dawn hit squads."⁴⁴ As was also commonly noted at the time, during the crucial period after the murder of Pavlos Fyssas and the pre-trial detention of leading Golden Dawn figures on charges of forming a criminal organization, the numbers of recorded organized hate crimes fell notably.⁴⁵

Would all this be enough for the Court? We did not know at that moment.


What we certainly knew was that what a member of the prosecution, Thanassis Kampagiannis, called “the biggest trial of fascist criminality since Nuremberg” remained largely underreported by the media. This meant that a large part of their activity remained unseen and hidden from the spotlight.⁴⁶

Thus, the “X them Out! The Black Map of Racist Violence” initiative rose from a very particular need: to reveal the organized hate crimes connected with Golden Dawn and make publicly known the extent of its criminal activity, which up to that point was reported by very few media outlets and was mainly shown through the valuable work of Golden Dawn Watch. Through this campaign, we attempted to establish a “topography” of the organized racist violence, to make its dark dimensions and its deadly nature more familiar to the general public, both in Greece and abroad. Our aim was to raise awareness around the ongoing trial proceedings, but also to strengthen the collective memory so that Greek society would never forget these repugnant acts.

In order to render it visible and precise, we decided to map racist violence right where it happened: in the streets. So, at the exact spot of each attack, we placed visible stickers with QR codes—a type of barcode—such that people could navigate the black map of racist violence on their phones. After we tracked down the gravest incidents through documented reports and court case files, we asked Greek visual graphic artists to capture them—each with their own personal gaze; the artists sometimes acted as “photojournalists” recording the incident while, at other times, they served as expressionist painters working to comprehend, interpret, and imprint their own “scream” against racist violence. Next, we placed each attack along with the corresponding picture and description on the map of Greece and uploaded it to the campaign’s website.⁴⁷ By clicking on the points on the map, the visitor realizes that each marks the scene of a bloody attack—that likely went unpunished.

Finally, we asked visual artists, nationally and internationally, to attend the Golden Dawn trial and sketch the main figures, thus providing fascinating visual material of proceedings that seem to have gone unnoticed by the national and international media. This multidimensional and collective attempt constitutes the backbone of the “X them Out! The Black Map of Racist Violence” initiative, which was also published in a book with the aim of practically contributing to the battle fought by the civil action lawyers in the Golden Dawn trial.⁴⁸ Marking the historic “guilty” verdict of 7 October 2020 at the Golden Dawn trial, the XthemOut material is also available a on virtual tour, serving as a historical landmark for generations to come.⁴⁹

Figure 2: Inside the courtroom. Artwork by Molly Crabapple.



NOW WHAT?

In October 2020, after five long years of trial proceedings, the leadership of neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn has been sentenced to hefty 13-year jail terms in a historic victory for the anti-fascist movement and the democratic world, both in Greece and internationally. The leader, Nikos Michaloliakos, and five other former MPs received that sentence for “directing a criminal organization”; a seventh defendant got 10 years. These individuals constitute the fascist party’s whole executive committee. On 23 October 2020, concluding proceedings that began in 2013, a three-member panel of judges led by Supreme Court justice Maria Lependioti ruled that its entire leadership be imprisoned after determining the brazenly violent group was in fact a criminal gang masquerading as a political party.⁵⁰

The first lawsuit against Golden Dawn had been brought by the respected lawyer Dimitris Zotos—who was also part of the Civil Action against Golden Dawn—back in 1996; we might well imagine that Pavlos Fyssas, Shehzad Luqman, Ali Abdul Manan, and others, would be alive today had the state authorities not blocked Mr. Zotos’s legal action 24 years ago. Today, no one in Greek public life can honestly claim that they did not know the reality of Golden

Dawn. “From 2010, Golden Dawn had managed to poison the Greek political system and democratic institutions, securing contacts with the army, the police, the judiciary and the Church. It is an excellent verdict,” stated Dimitris Psarras, another of the fight’s key figures.⁵¹

Yet the fight is anything but over. Throughout the proceedings, which had also led to a gradual operational dismantling of Golden Dawn, several extreme far-right groups have appeared to fill the void: groups like Anentahtoi Maiandroi Ethnikistes (AME)-Combat 18, Apella, and Krypteia—all directly or indirectly connected to Golden Dawn—have made their appearance targeting mostly migrants and refugees.⁵²


Greece has historically been a country with high levels of extreme far-right violence. The 2020 RTV Report by the Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) points to three current trends that are particularly noteworthy: the escalating violence in the conflict over the naming of the Republic of North Macedonia, the ongoing refugee crisis, and the continuation of violent activity by extreme-right militant groups.⁵³ These trends are intertwined and thus create an explosive mixture—especially in border areas. The ongoing militarization of Greek (and thus, European Union) borders is combined with the ongoing targeting of migrants and refugees through the toxic public discourse, a weaponization of the refugee issue in the context of EU-Turkey relations, and extensive human rights violations. This produces the ideal landscape for extreme far-right groups and parties to appear as “regulators.”⁵⁴

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These issues are coupled with other long-standing factors that enable the rise of far-right extremism. First, the overall crisis of democracy and political representation linked to the ongoing financial crisis that plunged the country into deep austerity is still present and will be even more acute after the emergency phase of the COVID-19 pandemic is over. Second, the links of Golden Dawn to the Greek “deep state” (police, the justice system, the church, etc.) that enabled its operational immunity all these years, have never been actually addressed.⁵⁵ It is telling that, when apprehended by the police, the physical perpetrator of the Fyssas murder in 2013, Giorgos Roupakias, told the officers: “I am with Golden Dawn, I am one of yours.”⁵⁶ Throughout the Court proceedings, the links between Golden Dawn and certain cells within the police were revealed without any doubt. When brought to the General Police Directorate of Attica, the arrested perpetrators of the brutal attack against the Egyptian fishermen at Perama were allowed, against any existing regulation or protocol, to change clothes and get rid of their Golden Dawn sweaters; this way, they were able to appear “clean” before the prosecutor, denying any affiliation with Golden

Dawn.⁵⁷ All of these corrupt police officers, along with several other public servants who form what we call the “Greek deep state,” have never been held accountable for their actions and omissions.⁵⁸

Still today, months after the verdict, Christos Pappas, Golden Dawn’s de facto number two, remains at large, while MEP Ioannis Lagos has refused to return home. The lawyer of the former has presumptuously stated that “he has no intention of surrendering because he believes the trial was politically motivated,” while the proceedings for the lifting of immunity for the latter are still pending before the European Parliament, six months after the verdict.

Since the burst of the economic crisis in 2010, no government has been formed in Greece without either a far-right party in the government coalition (LAOS, ANEL, etc.) or a distinct far-right wing within the government itself. Although the leader of the current government, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, personally expresses a more central, liberal approach, the fact remains that part of his government, too, is affiliated with the now condemned Golden Dawn. Notably, Michaloliakos’ successor within the youth wing of his National Political Union (EPEN), Makis Voridis, was recently appointed Minister of Interior, marking a concession to the mainstreaming of the far-right agenda.⁵⁹ Within this context, only one thing remains certain: the fight against far-right extremism and organized racism in Greece is far from over. 

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26. “For decades, Golden Dawn functioned as a typical militia, without distinguishing between formal party apparatus and paramilitary wing. This was due to the fact that its organizational structure was based on a so-called “secret statute”; that is, the party’s constitution that steered paramilitary inner structure of Golden Dawn. According to this document, its apparatus was based on ‘recruitment cells’ for new members “on probation: and the “(real) cells” that undertook street fights and other illegal activities and consisted of party members who passed the probation procedures. [...] Since August 2012, Golden Dawn has [also] a legal statute”, Vasiliki Georgiadou, “The Far Right,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Greek Modern Politics*, ed. Kevin Featherstone and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 249; Christos Pappas, the vice-leader of Golden Dawn, is several times depicted using the swastika flag and even teaching children to sing “Heil Hitler”, see Damian Mac Con Uladh, “Video shows Golden Dawn’s No 2 teaching children to chant ‘Heil Hitler!’,” <https://damomac.wordpress.com/2014/09/22/video-shows-golden-dawns-no-2-teaching-children-to-chant-sieg-heil/>.

27. Dimitris Christopoulos, “The Golden Dawn trial: a major event for democracy in Greece and beyond,” *Open Democracy*, January 26, 2018.

28. For an electoral analysis of the Golden Dawn vote, see Yannis Voulgaris and Ilias Nikolakopoulos, eds., 2012: *The double electoral earthquake* (Athens: Themelio, 2014).

29. Thanasis Kampagiannis, *With the bees or with the wolves. Closing statement at the Golden Dawn trial* (Athens: Antipodes, 2020), 41.

30. Dimitris Psarras, *Golden Dawn on trial* (Athens: Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung, 2015).

31. Golden Dawn convening at Thermopyles, August 25, 2012; see: Kampagiannis, *With the bees or with the wolves*.

32. Judith Sunderland, *Hate on the Streets. Xenophobic Violence in Greece* (Human Rights Watch, 2012).
33. The Racist Violence Recording Network (RVRN) was established in 2011 by the Greek National Commission for Human Rights and the Greek Office of UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency. Today, RVRN consists of 46 non-governmental organizations and civil society actors, as well as the Greek Ombudsman and the Migrants' Integration Council of the Municipality of Athens, as observers. The participating actors acknowledge and jointly pursue combating racist violence, as well as all racially-motivated acts on the grounds of race, color, religion, descent, national or ethnic origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, sex characteristics, and disability.
34. Racist Violence Recording Network, *2012 Annual Report*, <http://rvrn.org/2013/04/2012-annual-report/>.
35. There was, at that point, no guarantee as regards the possibility to lodge a complaint by persons who do not hold legal documents. Persons without legal residence documents, who constitute the majority of victims of racist attacks according to the recordings of the Network, even in case they wish to denounce the incidents, were automatically detained upon their arrival at the police station, and issued with detention and deportation orders. See: Racist Violence Recording Network, *2013 Annual Report*, <http://rvrn.org/2014/04/2013-annual-report/>.
36. Papadopoulou, *Standing, in public view*.
37. "The murder of Shehzad Luqman is a hate crime," Racist Violence Recording Network, <https://www.hlhr.gr/en/murder-shehzad-luqman-hate-crime/>.
38. Vassilis Papastergiou and Eleni Takou, *Migration in Greece, Eleven myths and even more truths* (Athens: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 2014), 43.
39. Roupakias and all his accomplices were proven to be registered members of Golden Dawn at the trial, see trial proceedings at: <https://goldendawnwatch.org/?lang=en>.
40. A visualized analysis of the charges can be found at the leaflet produced by Golden Dawn Watch: "The Golden Dawn Trial," Golden Dawn Watch, <https://goldendawnwatch.org/?p=1709&lang=en>.
41. On the definition of Criminal Organisation for the Golden Dawn case, see: Psarras, *Golden Dawn on trial*.
42. Data included in the prosecutorial proposal on Golden Dawn's indictment to trial, at https://jailgoldendawn.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/protash_ntogiakou.pdf.
43. See: Thanassis Kampagiannis, "3," in *The Black Map of Racist Violence*, ed. Electra Alexandropoulou and Eleni Takou (Athens: Topos Books, HumanRights360, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 2019), 110–13.
44. Giota Tessi, "This was the *modus operandi* of the assault squads," *Efimerida ton Syntakton*, https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/dikaioyni/i-diki-tis-hrysis-aygis/134400_etsi-htypoysan-ta-tagmata-efodoy.
45. Vassilis Papastergiou and Eleni Takou, *Persistent Myths about Migration in Greece* (Athens: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 2018), 69.
46. Will Horner, "What 'the biggest trial of fascist criminality since Nuremberg' means for the future of Greece," *Open Democracy*, November 17, 2016.
47. XthemOut, <https://valtousx.gr/>.
48. The book is available for purchase abroad here: <https://www.lexikopoleio.com/en/750648—all> proceeds from the sale are donated in support of the Civil Action Lawyers in the Golden Dawn trial.
49. Virtual tour of the XthemOut exhibition, https://my.matterport.com/show/?m=YiTCMXfUukM&fbclid=IwAR3bQNIgU2TAzBFSwtBCx1z6e_gfqUdHo3Za8pw6IjrfTUom7Gu9I8iv7WM.
50. Giota Tessi, "The Chronicle of Golden Dawn trial," *Simeio*, <https://simeio.org.gr/tekmiriosi/chroniko-tis-dikis-tis-chrisis-augis/>; see also: Moira Lavalley, "Greece's Nazi Golden Dawn Has Finally Been Ruled a Criminal Organization," *Jacobin*, <https://jacobinmag.com/2020/10/greece-nazi-golden-dawn-trial-verdict>.
51. "Greece Golden Dawn: Neo-Nazi leaders guilty of running crime gang," *BBC*, October 7, 2020.
52. Racist Violence Recording Network, *2018 Annual Report*, http://rvrn.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/RVRN_report_2018en.pdf.
53. Jacob Aasland Ravndal et al., *RTV Trend Report 2020: Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe, 1990–2019* (Oslo: Center for Research on Extremism, University of Oslo, 2020).
54. For the ongoing militarization of EU borders, see the border monitoring reports of HumanRights360,

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see “The European and National Asylum Policy at the Land Borders of Evros,” HumanRights360, February 2021, <https://www.humanrights360.org/the-european-and-national-asylum-policy-at-the-land-borders-of-evros/>.

55. Dimitris Christopoulos, ed., *The Deep State and the Extreme right in contemporary Greece* (Athens: Nissos Publications & Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 2014).

56. Testimony of the arresting officer Giorgos Kourentzis before the Court: “Day 25: ‘Do not say anything to anyone, I am yours, I am the Golden Dawn,’” Golden Dawn Watch, <https://goldendawnwatch.org/?p=1681>.

57. Thanasis Kampagiannis, *With the bees or with the wolves: Closing statement at the Golden Dawn trial* (Athens: Antipodes, 2020), 84–87.

58. See: Work of Forensic Architecture for the role of the police in the Fyssas murder: “The Murder of Pavlos Fyssas,” <https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-murder-of-pavlos-fyssas>.

59. Dimitris Psarras, “LAOS and Kolonaki,” *Efimerida ton Syntakton*, January 5, 2021, https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/275564_laos-kai-kolok.